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1THE NECESSITY FOR NON-CHALLENGE VISITS
by  Graham S. Pearson
Introduction
1.   In the discussions that have taken place over the past six years since the establishment by
the Third Review Conference1 in 1991 of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts,
known as VEREX, to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific
and technical viewpoint, there has been an increasing debate about the role of non-challenge
visits in a  regime for a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
The arguments as to why on-site investigations are an essential and central element to such a
strengthened regime were addressed in the Briefing Paper issued2 in July 1997.   In this
Briefing Paper, the necessity for non-challenge visits is addressed drawing upon the previous
VEREX, Ad Hoc Group (AHG), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM) experience.   The advantages and disadvantages of a regime
containing non-challenge visits are considered and the conclusion is reached that the
advantages far outweigh the disadvantages and that non-challenge visits are an important
element which could contribute significantly to the effectiveness of a future legally binding
instrument to strengthen the BTWC.
VEREX Considerations
2.    The VEREX considerations took place during the period immediately after the
Conference on Disarmament had completed the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) with its verification regime comprising both routine and challenge
inspections and whilst the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq was
carrying out on-site inspections of both chemical and biological facilities in Iraq using experts
from many of the States Parties to the BTWC to carry out these inspections and when
UNSCOM was developing and implementing its ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV)
plan3.
3.    VEREX in its identification and examination of potential verification measures from a
scientific and technical standpoint met twice in 1992 and twice in 1993 before producing its
final report in September 19934.   Some 21 measures, both off-site and  on-site were
examined:
Off-site Measures
                                                
1   United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992.
2Graham S Pearson, The Importance of On-Site Investigations, Briefing Paper No. 1, Department of Peace
Studies, University of Bradford, July 1997.
3United Nations Security Council,  Report of the Secretary General submitting the plan, revised pursuant to the
adoption of Security Council resolution 707(1991), for future monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance
with the destruction or removal of weapons specified in Security Council resolution 687(1991),  S/22871/Rev.1,
2 October 1991.
4United Nations,  Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification
Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, Report BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, Geneva 1993.
2- Surveillance of publications
- Surveillance of legislation
- Data on transfers, transfer requests and on publication
- Multilateral information sharing
- Exchange visits (off-site)
- Declarations
- Surveillance by satellite
- Surveillance by aircraft
- Ground based surveillance (off-site)




- Exchange visits - international arrangements
- Interviewing (on-site)
- Visual inspection (on-site)
- Identification of key equipment (on-site)
- Auditing (on-site)
- Sampling and identification (on-site)
- Medical examination (on-site)
- Continuous monitoring by instruments (on-site)
- Continuous monitoring by personnel (on-site)
4.   The mandate for VEREX was to identify and examine from a scientific and technical
standpoint measures which could determine:
- Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining
microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes;
- Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining
weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for
hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
These measures were to be examined in terms of six main criteria:
- Their strengths and weaknesses based on, but not limited to, the amount and quality
of information they provide, and fail to provide;
- Their ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities;
- Their ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance;
- Their technology, material, manpower and equipment requirements;
- Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications;
3- Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development
and other permitted activities, and their implications for the confidentiality of
commercial proprietary information.
5.    As already noted in Briefing Paper No. 1 on "The Importance of On-Site Investigations"
issued in July 1997, there was widespread support for the concept of international on-site
inspections from the outset of VEREX.   However, the question as to whether such on-site
investigations should be to investigate compliance concerns or to confirm compliance was
not addressed.    Rather the VEREX examination was  of the measures that might be used in
on-site inspection such as interviewing, visual inspection, identification of key equipment,
auditing and sampling and identification.
 6.  Thus in VEREX I, an Indian working paper5 addressed the concept of on-site
investigations without specifying whether these would be challenge or other inspections.
The working paper stated:
"The visits of the verification team need not be announced in advance.  The team may
visit any site both declared or undeclared of production or research and development
and should have full access to all parts of the establishment in question .....The
number of visits .... should be left to the discretion of the inspecting team....  The team
may also interview any of the workers in the establishment ....  The visiting team may
submit a report as soon as possible regarding (a) compliance, or (b) incomplete
compliance, or (c) no compliance,  or (d) inconsistency or ambiguity of replies
received or of the observed facts regarding the capabilities of the site, the activities
conducted or the agents handled.".
7.   Also at VEREX I, the idea of annual routine monitoring was included in a paper by Iran6
who said that:
"The WHO may carry out annual routine monitoring on all declared biological
facilities, being single or multi-purpose".
Peru  identified7 the need for both follow-up visits and challenge inspections:
"In short, Mr Chairman, whatever potential verification measures we succeed in
identifying and examining, the final result can only be a simple verification system.....
founded basically on declarations and follow–up visits, challenge inspections and
monitoring of transfers."[Emphasis added]
8.   At VEREX II Brazil  stated8 that:
                                                
5United Nations, A preliminary approach to the verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention,
Working Paper by India, BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.29, 9 April 1992.
6United Nations, Elements of biological weapons monitoring systems, Working Paper by Islamic Republic of
Iran, BWC/CONF.III/WP.25, 7 April 1992.
7United Nations, Statement by the head of the delegation of Peru, Dr Felix Calderon to the Ad Hoc Group of
Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical
Standpoint set up under the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons,
Working Paper by Peru, BWC/CONF.III/WP.22, 6 April 1992.
8United Nations, Preliminary Aspects on the Evaluation of the Potential Verification Measures as they were
proposed during the First meeting of the Governmental Expert Group,  Working Paper by Brazil,
BWC/CONF.III/WP.54, 25 November 1992.
4"On–site inspections are, of course, the more difficult task.  Preparation of previous
informations, and multi–disciplinary teams for on site inspections, rules of procedure
to guide inspections, confidentiality regulations, standardization of sampling and
identification methods, procedures for routine and at short notice inspections, and
finally inspection reports will be needed."[Emphasis added]
9.  The summary report9 of VEREX II included the reports of the rapporteurs, which had been
appointed to examine each of the measures identified, noting that "These summaries, which
are not considered to be exhaustive and might be further specified during evaluation, were
thoroughly discussed by the Group, producing consolidated texts to serve as a basis of the
beginning of the evaluation".  One of these summaries noted that many facilities had routine
or regular visits:
"On–site visit to facilities and establishments with activities of potential relevance to
the objectives of the Convention is generally carried out by various national and
international institutions and under different legislations in almost all countries.  The
inspectors of WHO have already routine visits to biological and industrial centres.
These centres and facilities are used to and in practice are under the obligation to
accept visits by responsible national authorities, particularly when they implement
GMP, GLP and Biosafety type regulations.  It can therefore be concluded that such a
visual inspection is not uncommon or unusual for such establishments.
 (Mohammadi, BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.82/Rev.1)
whilst another noted that on-site inspections might be to confirm declarations:
"An essential part of an on–site inspection is the assessment of a facilities capacities
and the equipment used to ensure that the equipment is not used for prohibited
activities.  Another aspect of on–site inspections is to confirm declarations"
(Bovallius, BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.83/Rev.1)
10.    Some of the other rapporteur summaries for off-site measures noted that these might
help to build up over time a picture of microbiological activity in a State Party.   Thus in the
category of Information Monitoring, the capabilities included:
"- May help in establishing patterns of activity
- Could reveal "trends" and "trendlike" developments
- Provides background for further investigation, if deemed necessary."
(Gevers, BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP.71/Rev.1)
and in the same paper in respect of Surveillance of Publications the capabilities included:
                                                
9United Nations,  Summary of the work of the Ad Hoc Group for the period 23 November to 4 December 1992,
Report BWC/CONF.III/VEREX 4, 8 December 1992
5"- Could help in getting a general picture of activities and/or yield specific
information on selected sites."
(Gevers, BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP.71/Rev.1)
A similar idea was also developed in the paper on Declarations where the capabilities
included:
"-..It could help to build up a picture of approaches to microbiological work, health
and safety in the country against which other measures could be judged."
(Kapur, BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP. 72/Rev.1)
11.   The subsequent VEREX III meeting continued the evaluation of the various measures
with the concept of developing a picture over time of the microbiological norm for a State
Party being recognised in the context of several of the measures, both off site and on-site.
Thus the measures on surveillance of information such as Surveillance of Publications
included as capabilities the words:
"- General pattern of activities in a State party may be construed
- Could help in identifying inconsistencies
- May help focus on-site inspections"
(Gevers, BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP. 151)
with similar words "- Could help establish pattern of activity in a State Party" for each of the
other three information monitoring measures -- Surveillance of Legislation, Data on
Transfers, and Multilateral Information Sharing.   This concept was echoed in the summary
for Declarations which stated:
"Declarations, if properly structured, could be an important mechanism for building
up a picture of the biological activities in a nation."
(Duncan, BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.156)
The evaluation for Auditing (On-Site) said:
"It [Auditing (On-Site)] is considered to have a synergistic effect in combination with
interviewing, visual inspection, identification of key equipment, sampling and
identification, and medical examination, and together with information gained from
off-site measures such as information monitoring and declarations could be used by an
inspectorate to build up a picture of the normal activity and to assess overall
consistency and coherence."
(Noble, BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP. 167)
12.   Consequently, by the end of the VEREX process the idea of on-site inspections, without
specifying whether these were challenge or routine in nature, and of the building up over time
6of a picture of normal activity in a State Party to aid in the assessment of consistency had
been broadly expressed.
Special Conference
13.   The final report of VEREX was then considered by the Special Conference in September
1994.  The report of the Special Conference10 included in its Summary Record statements
made by various delegations. These included the following remarks11 by Mr Donald Mahley
of the USA:
"The measures set forth in the protocol should help strengthen the Convention by
establishing an official benchmark for identifying discrepancies or ambiguities
pertaining to facilities or activities and for seeking clarification, providing a
mechanism for pursuing specific activities of concern and allowing for direct
diplomatic engagement to resolve compliance concerns." [Emphasis added]
14.   Several working papers were presented to the Special Conference.   Germany speaking
on behalf of the European Union proposed12 a mandate for an Ad Hoc Working Group on
Verification which included in the basic elements of a mandatory regime:
"-on-site measures such as information visits to declared facilities, short-notice
inspections, and investigations of alleged use."[Emphasis added].
Many States Parties, including Canada, associated themselves formally with the EU proposed
mandate in its entirety.    A Brazilian working paper13 said:
"The large number of facilities that should probably have to be included in national
declarations makes it necessary to limit the use of routine inspections to a minimum.
Only the most sensitive facilities (eg those working with defensive military programs,
military vaccination and genetic manipulation of listed pathogens) should be routinely
inspected."
and went on to say:
"Alongside short notice inspections, it seems useful to establish a mechanism of
validation visits, which would be part of cooperation programs between the
organization and national authorities.   Such visits would help in the process of
preparing, checking, updating and improving national declarations and would
lead to recommendations by the secretariat to national authorities and facility
                                                
10United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, 19 - 30 September 1994, Geneva.
11United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Report, Part IV, Page 89, BWC/SPCONF/1, 19 - 30 September 1994, Geneva.
12Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of the European Union, Proposal for a Mandate for an Ad-Hoc
Working Group on Verification, BWC/SPCONF/WP. 1, 20 September 1994.
13Brazil, Strengthening the BWC;  Elements for a Possible Verification System, BWC/SPCONF/WP.4, 21
September 1994.
7operators, including recommendations on biological safety practices."[Emphasis
added]
The United States working paper14 in a draft mandate included as one of the basic elements of
the regime:
"- Any on-site measures should be designed to, among other things, strengthen
confidence in information exchanged among States parties..."[Emphasis added]
Australia in its working paper15 also supported the concept of information visits by
identifying basic elements in the mandate as including:
"- On-site measures such as information visits to declared facilities, short notice
inspections and investigations of allegations of use."[Emphasis added].
15.   The report of the Special Conference noted that the VEREX report had considered that
"some combinations of some potential verification measures, including both off-site and on-
site measures, could provide information which could be useful for the main objective of the
Biological Weapons Convention." [Emphasis added].    The Special Conference agreed to
establish a further Ad Hoc Group with the objective being to consider appropriate measures,
including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to
be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be submitted for the
consideration of the States Parties.
CWC Inspections
16.   The CWC16 which opened for signature on 13-15 January 1993 and entered into force on
29 April 1997 comprises a regime of comprehensive declarations together with both routine
and challenge inspections as well as provisions for the investigation of alleged use and the
monitoring of the destruction of declared chemical weapons and chemical weapon production
facilities.     The relevance of the provisions of the CWC to the BTWC is three fold.  First,
both Conventions prohibit the development and production of weapons which attack people -
- in the one case by non-living materials (chemicals) and in the other by living materials
(micro-organisms) and their non-living products (toxins).   Second, there is an overlap -- and
rightly so -- between the two Conventions in that both cover toxins.   Thus the CWC and its
verification regime applies to toxins -- and examples of toxins, such as saxitoxin and ricin,
are listed in the CWC Schedules -- as does the BTWC.    Third, the CWC is the arms control
treaty that is of greatest relevance to the BTWC;  it is much more closely relevant than the
NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) or the
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) 93 + 2.   The structure and provisions of the
CWC are thus well worth examining as in order to reach agreement on the CWC, the
negotiators had to resolve many issues which will arise in similar, if not always identical,
form in the BTWC context.
                                                
14United States of America, Consideration of VEREX Report, BWC/SPCONF/WP. 10, 22 September 1994.
15Australia, Further Action to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention -- Australian Views on the Form
of Future Negotiations, BWC/SPCONF/WP.12, 22 September 1994.
16United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, United Nations 93-05070, 1993.
817.   One of the provisions in the CWC is that for routine inspection to carry out "on-site
verification" of declared facilities:  there are seven broad types of such facilities; the chemical
weapons storage facilities (Part IV), chemical weapons production facilities (Part V),
chemical weapons destruction facilities (Part IV), Schedule 1, 2 and 3 facilities where
Schedule 1. 2 and 3 chemicals are consumed, processed and/or produced (Part VI, Part VII
and Part VIII respectively); and, not liable for inspection until three years after entry into
force, facilities producing "unscheduled discrete organic chemicals"(Part IX).    For the
purposes of this Briefing Paper, particular attention is given to the provisions for the
verification of Schedule 1, 2 and 3 and other chemicals facilities in respect of "Activities not
prohibited under this Convention in accordance with Article VI".
18.   The output of the routine inspections is information to validate declarations.   Some of
this is disseminated to States Parties, thereby enabling them to be better able to assess the
good faith of other States  Parties.   Potential cheaters will be able to gain insight into the
risks of abusing facilities subject to routine verification and may in consequence be driven out
of such facilities17.    For each type of facility, the Convention lays down different declaration
validating procedures to be used by the Technical Secretariat;  for some types of facility, a
"facility agreement" is required which limits the threat to confidential proprietary information
and national security information whilst guaranteeing the essential access to the inspectors.
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plant site









Up to 2 per year per
plant site, within
overall limit
* An unscheduled discrete organic chemical  containing the elements phosphorus,
sulfur or fluorine referred to in the Convention as "PSF-plants" or "PSF-
chemical".
19.   The other key feature is the degree of access provided during routine inspections:
                                                
17Julian P Perry Robinson, The Verification System of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in Daniel Bardonnet
(ed), "The Convention on the Prohibition and Elimination of Chemical Weapons:  A Breakthrough in
Multilateral Disarmament, Hague Academy of International Law, Workshop, The Hague, 24 - 26 November
1994, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1995.
9Schedule 1 Automatic access to declared facilities
Schedule 2 Automatic access to plant site and to specified areas within 
declared plants;  beyond that to provide clarification or under 
managed access
Schedule 3 Automatic access to plant site and to specified areas within 
declared plants;  beyond that as agreed to provide clarification
Other chemicals Automatic to plant site; managed access within plants
In the case of Schedule 2 routine inspections, access is only to the specific declared
Scheduled 2 plant within the declared plant site.   The Verification Annex to the CWC details
in Part VII, paragraph 25, that "should the inspection team request access to other parts of the
plant site, access to these areas shall be granted in accordance with the obligation to provide
clarification pursuant to Part II, paragraph 51 of this Annex and in accordance with the
facility agreement, or in the absence of a facility agreement, in accordance with the rules of
managed access as specified in Part X, Section C, of this Annex."   A similar arrangement
applies to Schedule 3 routine inspections where Part VIII, paragraph 20 states that "if the
inspection team, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 51 of this Annex, requests access to
other parts of the plant site for clarification of ambiguities, the extent of such access shall be
agreed between the inspection team and the inspected State Party."
20.   The provisions of the CWC for the carrying out of routine inspections of Schedule 1, 2 ,
3 and other chemical facilities are relevant and could serve as a basis or a model when
considering the potential role for non-challenge visits in the verification regime for the
BTWC.   It is, however, important to emphasise that the proposed non-challenge visits for a
strengthened BTWC are definitely not envisaged as being routine as in the sense of the CWC
inspections.
UNSCOM Inspections
21.   Although the situation in respect of UNSCOM and Iraq is unique, it is relevant to
consider what lessons can be drawn concerning the importance of non-challenge visits.
22.   Following the Iraq invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the coalition war against
Iraq in early 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687 (1991)18 on 3
April 1991  which set out the requirements for the cease-fire.    This resolution also required
in Section C that Iraq was to eliminate, under international supervision, its chemical and
biological weapons stockpiles and its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km.  Iraq
was required to submit to the Secretary-General, within 15 days of the Resolution’s adoption,
a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of such weapons, and the Secretary-General
was to develop a plan for creating a Special Commission to "carry out immediate on-site
inspection of Iraq's biological chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations
and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself" in order to
take possession of these weapons and supervise their destruction.  The Secretary-General was
also required to develop, in consultation with the Special Commission, a plan for the future
                                                
18United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution establishing detailed measures for a cease-fire,
including deployment of the United Nations Observer Unit; arrangements for demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait
border; the removal or destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and measures to prevent their
reconstitution, under the supervision of a Special Commission and the Director General of the IAEA; and
creation of a compensation fund to cover direct loss and damage resulting from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait,
S/RES/687 (1991), 3 April 1991.
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ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the ban on these weapons and
missiles.
23.   The plan for ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV)  is based on declarations and
on-site inspections primarily carried out by expert teams located at the Baghdad Monitoring
and Verification Centre.     The Special Commission's plan19 for the future ongoing
monitoring and verification (OMV) of Iraq's compliance with its undertaking not to retain,
possess, develop, construct or otherwise acquire any of the proscribed weapons systems,
requires that Iraq provide detailed declarations not later than 30 days after the adoption of the
OMV plan by the Security Council and thereafter at six monthly intervals on 15 January and
15 July of each year.     The elements of the plan are the provision of the declarations, the
carrying out of baseline inspections of the facilities to be monitored, the creation of protocols
for each facility which record the collated information about the particular facility so forming
a basis which subsequent inspections can use in comparing current and past activities.    As
the UNSCOM report20 of April 1995 indicated, the basic elements of the OMV system are
regular inspections of relevant facilities, inventories of dual purpose items and accounting for
all inventoried items until they are consumed, disposed of or no longer operable.   The
inspections and the establishment and maintainance of accurate inventories are underpinned
by a full array of interlocking activities:  aerial surveillance with a variety of sensors, remote
sensors, tags and seals, a variety of detection technologies, information obtained from other
sources and notifications under the export/import control mechanism.   Together UNSCOM
consider that these should constitute the most comprehensive international monitoring system
ever established in the sphere of arms control.    Currently some 86 biological sites are being
regularly monitored21 under the OMV plan with over 150 visits being carried out to these
sites in a six month period22.   The value and importance of these regular visits is evident
from the observations made by UNSCOM that inaccuracies in the Iraqi declarations continue
to be found;  the latest UNSCOM report21 of April 1997 states that "Iraq has still not declared
all sites where dual-use biological equipment is present.   The Commission's resident
monitoring team continues to identify such sites that should have been declared by Iraq."
24.   As the UNSCOM OMV plan is designed to monitor the compliance of Iraq with the
prohibition on weapons of mass destruction and the missiles which could deliver them, it is a
special case.   Nevertheless, it is clear that the concept of non-challenge visits coupled with
declarations lies at the heart of the OMV plan and is an essential tool for building confidence
in Iraq's compliance.
25. It has also become apparent from the experience of UNSCOM in mounting inspections in
Iraq that different approaches, from those adopted in countries such as the US and the UK
                                                
19United Nations Security Council,  Report of the Secretary General submitting the plan, revised pursuant to
the adoption of Security Council resolution 707(1991), for future monitoring and verification of Iraq's
compliance with the destruction or removal of weapons specified in Security Council resolution 687(1991),
S/22871/Rev.1, 2 October 1991.
20United Nations Security Council, Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation
of the plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with relevant parts of Section C of
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/1995/284, 10 April 1995.
21United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1997/301, 11
April 1997.
22United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 1991, S/1996/848, 11
October 1996.
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which have provided the Chief Inspectors for many of the BW Inspections, are taken by Iraq
to the handling of pathogenic organisms.    More generally, Iraq in its weapons of mass
destruction programmes has used both some novel approaches and other older approaches,
which have been discarded as inefficient by other countries.   For example, in its nuclear
weapons programme, Iraq used cyclotrons to enrich uranium, an approach which had long
ago been superseded by newer techniques.    And in its chemical weapons programme, Iraq
had produced the nerve agent, GF, which had been regarded as being insufficiently stable for
chemical weapons which required to be stockpiled for possible retaliatory use.   It has
therefore been particularly important that UNSCOM gained an accurate appreciation of the
way in which Iraq approaches microbiological safety and the handling of microbiological
pathogens in order for UNSCOM to be able to reach correct assessments of the significance
of Iraqi activities in the microbiological area.
Ad Hoc Group
26.   The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) under the chairmanship of Ambassador Toth of Hungary
held a procedural meeting on 3 - 5 January 199523 and then substantive meetings on 10 -21
July 199524, 27 November - 8 December 199525, 15 - 26 July 199626, 16 -27 September
199627, 3-21 March 199728 and 14 July - 1 August 199729.   During these Ad Hoc Group
meetings there has been much discussion of the nature of the regime and what provisions
should be made for on-site inspections.
27.   The AHG meeting in July 1995, which was the first substantive meeting, saw the
presentation of a number of working papers which addressed on-site measures.   The paper by
Cuba30 identified "Validation and Inspection Visits" as a main element of the verification
regime.   The working paper identified three categories of visits : validation visits, routine
inspections and challenge inspections.   In respect of validation visits and routine inspections,
the paper said that:
                                                
23  United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/3, 6 January 1995.
24  United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/28, 24 July 1995.
25  United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/29, 12 December 1995.
26 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/31,  26 July 1996.
27United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/32,  27 September 1996.
28United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/34,  27 March 1997.
29United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/36,  4 August 1997.
30Cuba, Elements for a Possible Verification regime in the Framework of the Convention on Biological
Weapons,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/8, 9 July 1995.
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"Validation visits
As a complement to the yearly declarations and notices, visits should be paid
to validate what is declared....
Routine inspections
This kind of inspection should be limited to the least possible and should be
applied in those declared facilities which are most relevant for the
Convention...."
It was made clear that the future organization should have a reasonable degree of autonomy in
selecting which facilities should be subject to routine inspections which would include the
following
"- facilities that participate in military programs of research for defense
- facilities that genetically manipulate pathogens included in the lists under control
- facilities that manipulate biological agents included in 3.A Category (agents that
should be subject to certain additional restrictions) of the list of agents extremely
important for the Convention."
28.   A UK working paper31 on the role and objectives of information visits provides a
comprehensive insight into what these would entail and achieve.   The paper noted that:
"It is highly unlikely that agreement could ever be secured for a protocol based
exclusively on challenge inspections.... A mechanism with only a challenge provision
would set an unnecessary high threshold for the on-site measures that could be taken
to pursue non-compliance concerns.   There are also grounds for doubting whether
such an arrangement could be as effective as a package of interrelated measures
consisting of declarations, short notice validation/information inspections/visits,
challenge inspections and procedures for investigating alleged use."
The paper identifies some five interrelated benefits:
"(i) providing an opportunity to validate declarations in the context of the site and
hence encourage State Parties to make accurate declarations;
(ii) facilitating transparency of national microbiological activities related to the
BTWC;
(iii) providing an understanding of how national safety, genetic engineering, quality
control, GMP etc rules and regulations operate and how they are implemented in
practice;
                                                
31United Kingdom, The Role and Objectives of Information Visits,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/21, 13 July 1995.
13
(iv) facilitating the relationship between the State Party and the Organisation on issues
such as national requests for assistance on declarations; and an opportunity to review
declaration procedures with individual States Parties;
(v) contributing to deterring potential proliferators."
Each of these is elaborated in detail before conclusions are drawn which include the
following:
"The nature of BW means that it is not practicable to approach the design of
verification measures purely in terms of quantitative criteria.... Simple "bean
counting" of dual use agents and equipment will not strengthen the Convention.
Instead inspectors have to make qualitative judgements about the consistency and
plausibility of the information obtained.
 A protocol based solely on challenge inspection would not be negotiable, nor indeed
as effective as an integrated package of measures as outlined here.   It would,
moreover, be expensive to keep a cadre of full-time inspectors on stand-by against the
day that a challenge inspection might be requested.
Industry has an overriding preference for full-time professional inspectors as they pose
a much lesser risk to commercial confidentiality.   In fact this is paralleled by a
governmental benefit in respect of the protection of national security information.
Full-time inspectors enable the conduct of timely and effective inspections:  they also
ensure that the system of visits and its attendant benefits are fully exploited.   Such
inspectors are much more likely to be competent as an organisation can better
maintain high and uniform approaches.  Furthermore, teams can be assembled quickly
from a pool of experienced personnel, well versed in inspection techniques, trained to
the same standard, and possessing the necessary vaccinations."
The paper concluded that "visits should not impose an unreasonable burden on legitimate
activities....It is essential  to see visits as part of an integrated package;  the benefits are
mutually reinforcing, but they will not work in isolation.  Their utility must be viewed in
conjunction with other elements of the compliance protocol."[Emphasis in original].
29.   A Brazilian paper32 addressing the implementation of Article X makes the point that
"Some of the [Article X] cooperative measures could be implemented in connection with
validation or information visits, during which the organization would also collect relevant
information on biotechnological activities at one or several geographically close facilities....."
30.   A Swedish paper33 addressed some possible elements in a verification protocol which
included in a section on on-site inspection:
"Minimum requirements for a verification regime are, a well-focussed declaration
system, on-site inspections and multilateral information systems.   These measures are
required, as there must be a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the information
                                                
32Brazil, Specific Measures for Implementation of Article X in the Context of a Compliance Regime for the
BWC, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/22, 13 July 1995.
33Sweden, Some Possible Elements in a Verification Protocol,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/25, 14 July 1995.
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supplied in the declarations and for this some type on on-site inspection is required
....In comparison with the CWC it is proposed that on-site inspections of a routine
type for validation of declarations and information gathering for the BTWC should be
strongly restricted in frequency and intensity to a small number of inspections/visits
per year to keep inspectors and an inspectorate well trained and give them adequate
experience but at the same time limiting the costs."
31.   The Friend of the Chair paper on Compliance Measures annexed to the July 1995
procedural report included the following34 in respect of non-challenge inspections:
"- Validation/information visits.   Their main purpose could be to check the accuracy
of declarations, encourage active demonstration of compliance and enhance credibility
of declarations.  Such visits could provide information related to that in declarations,
they could be arranged in advance and limited in number.
- Routine visits/inspections.   Their purpose could be to help demonstrate compliance
at particular declared facilities.  Such visits could be limited to specific facilities,
which might include military biodefence facilities, facilities that genetically
manipulate listed agents, and facilities working with particular pathogens and toxins.
Such visits could provide information related to declarations and be limited in
number.
- Further consideration could be given to the possibility of merging
validation/information visits and routine inspections, and what period of notice would
be appropriate."
Whilst this captures many of the points made in the working papers, it does not fully reflect
the valid points outlined in paragraph 27 above about the benefits from such visits made in
the UK working paper.
32.  The AHG meeting in September 1995, which was the second substantive meeting, saw
further working papers which addressed non-challenge visits.  A further working paper by
Sweden35 put forward proposals that:
"- Two main types of on-site visits/inspections are required.   One would be a short
notice on-site information visit and the other would be a short notice on-site
inspections.    There would be no need for a separate type of routine visits/inspections.
- Short notice on-site information visits would be what is referred to as
"validation/information visits/inspections" in the FOC paper.   A selection of the most
relevant facilities/activities from those declared for short notice information visits
should be made, on the basis of elaborated modalities, in order to achieve an
appropriate limitation in the number of such visits.
                                                
34United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/28, 24 July 1995: Annex III/2, page 3.
35Sweden, Short Notice On-Site Information Visits and Inspections as Parts of a verification Regime for the
BTWC,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 15, 29 November 1995.
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- Short notice on-site inspections could be undertaken with respect to questions of
non-compliance with the BTWC, including allegation of use." [Emphasis in original]
The proposed on-site information visits "would be to allow demonstration of compliance
including that ongoing and/or planned activities are in accordance with the information
provided in declarations and that there are no other declarable activities/items (within the
facilities declared) which ought to be declared."
33.   A working paper by Cuba36 elaborated ideas for a potential verification regime which in
a section entitled "On-Site Verification by Inspections" stated:
"Inspections for the validity of what have been declared shall be carried out as a
complement to the annual declarations and notifications.   These may be:
Routine inspections
Challenge inspections
As a premise, all the facilities that have submitted one or other type of declaration
must be subject to an initial visit in order to validate what has been said and in which
the following measures shall be fulfilled:
1.  Data on transfers, requests for transfer and production of biological agents
controlled by the Convention (Measure 1)
2.  Visual inspection (Measure 15)
3.   Identification of equipment controlled by the Convention (Measure 16)
4.  Preparation of the model of agreement between the Body of Inspectors, the
national Authority and the Facilities subject to verification.
After the initial visits have been carried out, a process where routine investigations
shall be applied, shall start.   The amount of agents, toxins and controlled equipment,
the research and development programs for biological defense, the production and
release of aerosols to the environment will define, more accurately, the frequency of
these inspections."
34.   Brazil37 in a further working paper said that "information/Validation visits could be an
important element of a future BWC verification system, providing both deterrence and
transparency, and could harness several cooperation activities...   Information/validation visits
could follow a programme established by the future organization in consultation with donor
and recipient countries, as well as with multilateral international organizations providing
cooperation."
                                                
36Cuba, Elements for a Potential Verification Regime within the Framework of the Convention for the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
Convention and on their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention),  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 22, 30
November 1995.
37Brazil, Recent Trends in the Biology of Infectious Agents and Cooperation as an Element of the BWC
Compliance Regime,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 24, 1 December 1995.
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35.   The FOC on compliance measures produced two working papers38 during the AHG
meeting which touched on the role of non-challenge visits.   The FOC paper39 annexed to the
procedural report said
"Other, non-challenge visits, might also have a role to play.  Consideration was given
to the possible justification for them.   Two broad justifications were identified:
(i) Non-challenge visits might have a deterrent role.  They could be used to
seek clarification where concerns fell short of those which would justify a
claim of possible non-compliance with the BWC.   For example, they could be
used to resolve any uncertainties about declarations.   This would be useful as
a means of confirming the accuracy of declarations.   This would help create
confidence and build transparency.   For maximum effectiveness, such visits
should be at short notice.
(ii) Some non-challenge visits could be used to convey information to a State
party about other relevant matters, including Article V and Article X issues.....
.....It was also recognised that a main advantage of non-challenge visits was that they
were much less politically sensitive than challenge inspections, and that this political
neutrality should be preserved...." [Emphasis in the original]
36.   The AHG meeting in July 1996, which was the third substantive meeting, saw further
working papers which addressed non-challenge visits.   A working paper40 by South Africa
sought to categorize the facilities involved and affected by declarations and inspections into
four types with the inspections for each specified:
"Category 1:  Purely teaching, education linked research or diagnostic laboratories:
These facilities would primarily be involved in confidence building or
exchange visits
Category 2:  Commercial and production units
Regular inspections under "managed access" of declared facilities would be
expected.   All these facilities could, however, be included in a system of
confidence building visits.
Category 3:  Epidemiology and disease control units (including biohazard research
units)
                                                
38Friend of the Chair for Compliance Measures, Proposed Revision of paragraph 6 of FOC July Paper,
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 17, 30 November 1995.   Friend of the Chair for Compliance Measures, On-Site
Measures, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 37, 5 December 1995.
39United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/29, 12 December 1995: Annex III/2, page 28.
40South Africa, Classification of Facilities Involved and Affected by Declarations and Inspections,  BWC/AD
HOC GROUP/WP. 53, 15 July 1996.
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Regular inspections would be expected and exchange visits should be
encouraged
Category 4:  Defensive BTW units.
Regular inspections would be expected"
Another South African paper (South Africa, A System of Confidence Building Visits,
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 64, 16 July 1996) addresses a system of confidence building
visits which have the aim of "promoting confidence between States parties, as well as in a
future BWC Organization".   However, participation in the system was envisaged as being
voluntary, and the participants would not be inspectors but rather experts nominated by States
Parties.   Consequently such visits would not contribute to the understanding of the future
BTWC Organization and its inspectorate nor would it contribute to enhancing international
confidence in compliance.
37.   A Canadian paper41 described a practice non-challenge visit to a bio-defence facility
which demonstrated that such visits were indeed practicable.   The conclusion was reached
that "cross-referencing of data was not only the most effective way to proceed in clarifying
any apparent discrepancies, it was also the most effective way to address confidence overall."
Although not explicitly stated, the paper leaves the clear impression that the practice visit had
confirmed the value of such non-challenge visits which were shown to interlock with
declarations and notifications.   It was stated that "well-designed, coherent, and integrated
declaration forms will be central to a successful visit."
38.   The European Union also produced a working paper42 on non-challenge visits which
noted "In particular, the deterrence value against non-compliance of short-notice non-
challenge visits, even if such visits are relatively limited in number, would make a significant
contribution to a future verification Protocol."   The paper sets out the justification for non-
challenge visits as follows:
"The main justification for such visits is that they would help to strengthen confidence
in compliance by helping to resolve uncertainties about declarations and confirm their
accuracy.   They would do this by creating a deterrent against non-compliance,
provided they are notified at short notice (24 hours notice).   Non-challenge visits
would be a way of providing confidence that all States parties were taking their
obligations seriously.  The following points are relevant:
A.   Although the eventual compliance regime should include a provision for
challenge inspections, these will have a politically sensitive character.   A
system of non-challenge visits would therefore provide an extra deterrent
against non-compliance, provided that these visits are notified at short notice,
by ensuring that a State could never be confident that its activities would not
be subject to inspections.
                                                
41Canada, Practice Non-Challenge Visit of a Defence Research Establishment,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.
60, 15 July 1996.
42Ireland on behalf of the European Union, European Union discussion paper regarding short notice non-
challenge visits,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 67, 16 July 1996.
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B.   Exclusion of the possibility of non-challenge visits would place the entire
burden of the regime on declarations and challenge inspections.   There would
always be scope for a proliferator to submit false declarations, in the
expectation that he was ever likely to be faced with a challenge.
C.  Non-challenge visits would help to build transparency and could clarify
concerns which might otherwise lead to false judgements being made.   A
system of non-challenge visits would enable the future BTWC organisation to
verify declarations and to resolve uncertainties about declarations.
D.  A proliferator is likely to prefer legitimate cover for his activities, in the
absence of non-challenge visits.    He might therefore want to use a declared
site if possible.   This would help him to obtain the necessary equipment,
materials and expertise.   The possibility of non-challenge visits to declared
sites would make a proliferator's task more difficult.   He would then have to
take additional precautions to conceal his tracks.
E.   A non-challenge visit might catch a proliferator off guard.   In a challenge
inspection, the proliferator would probably have had a clear indication of the
specific compliance concern and might be able to take rapid measures to cover
his tracks.
F.   The likelihood of a non-challenge visit uncovering concrete evidence of
BW-related activities is low.   But inspectors might uncover information that
could arouse suspicion.   Such information might, for example, come from
inconsistencies in accounts given by staff about activities at the site, or the use
of equipment, material, etc.   Such inconsistencies would provide clear
grounds for suspicion which could then be followed up.   Non-challenge visits
also have value as a means of facilitating any subsequent challenge visits,
which would be more effective if inspectors had prior knowledge of the site.
G.  To achieve a deterrent effect, non-challenge visits should be notified at
short notice, e.g. 24 hours....
H.   Non-challenge visits could also serve other objectives of the BTWC,
namely development of technological cooperation under Article X...."
39.  The Brazil and UK produced a joint working paper43 on a joint UK/Brazil practice non-
challenge visit carried out at the Instituto Butantan, Sao Paolo.  The following general
observations were made:
"NCVs ... are practicable and useful in addressing two interrelated objectives.   Firstly,
they may provide some reassurance of compliance, mainly through transparency and
openness, by facilitating access to information that would not otherwise be available
from the visited institutions declaration, no matter how detailed and comprehensive.
Secondly, NCVs can create a working environment that may be conducive to
international cooperation in various fields, especially in those that may have a direct
                                                
43Brazil and the UK, Report of a Joint UK/Brazil Practice Non-Challenge Visit,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.
76, 18 July 1996.
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bearing on the visited State's capacity to demonstrate compliance with the BTWC.
An NCV can help determine whether the state can ensure adequate control over all
relevant activities in the biological field on its territory or under its jurisdiction or
control."
The conclusions were that
"An NCV offers an opportunity to discuss the declaration and correct any omissions,
inaccuracies or misunderstandings.   The VEREX on-site measures were of
considerable value and worked exceptionally well in combination.....
Even with a short period of time available for on-site activities, it was still sufficient
for the IT [inspection team] in this instance to acquire a much better appreciation of
the site's activities without any detriment to any commercial concerns or undue
inconvenience to the facility personnel.   This achieved two things:  first it helped
place the declaration into its proper context;  and second, the information acquired
from both declaration and site visit together added significantly to transparency
thereby increasing confidence that declared activities were what they claimed to
be......NCVs could contribute significantly to an overall BTWC compliance regime."
40.   Another working paper by Australia44 reported on a trial non-challenge/routine
inspection of a biotechnology company.   The objectives were to
"* investigate the feasibility of verifying a declaration through a routine inspection
* assess whether an inspection of this sort could have a deterrent function; and
* assess the impact of a routine inspection on the activities of a commercial facility."
The paper concluded that:
"The inspection team was satisfied that .... a routine inspection could be achieved in a
manner which would not disrupt production in a commercial biotechnology facility,
and by the application of appropriate managed access procedures (including random
selective access of production records), would not jeopardize confidential
information.
"Based on the experience of this trial inspection, we consider that a system of routine
inspections on certain types of biotechnology facilities would significantly deter
violations by imposing a substantial risk of discovery, and, at the same time, would
provide mechanisms for demonstrating compliance that would enhance confidence
that other States parties were in compliance with he BWC."
41.   The FOC paper on compliance measures annexed to the procedural report of the July
1996 AHG meeting included a section45 entitled "Other Visits" in the paper on "On-Site
                                                
44Australia, Trial Inspection of a Biological Production Facility,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 77, 18 July
1996.
45United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/31,  26 July 1996: Annex III, page 30.
20
Measures".   The flavour of this was similar to what had been said in the FOC paper annexed
to the November/December 1995 AHG meeting, and did not appear to reflect the positive
remarks made in the EU paper or the successful practice non-challenge visits reported to the
AHG, in saying:
"There was discussion of the role which visits other than those to investigate a
specific concern about compliance about the BWC might play in any future
compliance regime.  A key question was whether they would be cost-effective and
useful.
Various concepts were put forward:
(i) Some non-challenge visits could be used to convey information to a State
party about other relevant matters, and could therefore have a role to play in
implementing Article V and Article X.   It might be more appropriate to look
at some aspects of this type of visit in the context of Article X.
(ii) Random visits.   These could have deterrent values.   They could take place
at short notice on the basis of agreed criteria.   They could be conducted by
experts from States Parties and/or an international inspectorate.
(iii) Short notice non-challenge visits.   These could make it more difficult for
a proliferant to conceal non-compliant activity within a declared site.   In
addition, they could help to strengthen confidence in the accuracy of
declarations, e.g. by providing a mechanism to help resolve uncertainties.
(iv)  Visits specifically to address a concern/ambiguity which fell short of a
concern about compliance with the BWC itself (i.e. a concern about the
accuracy of the declaration).   It was pointed out that any visit designed
expressly to address a concern could be regarded as close to a "challenge", and
could involve similar sensitivities"
42.    The AHG meeting in September 1996, which was the fourth substantive meeting, saw
further working papers which addressed non-challenge visits.   Brazil in a paper46 addressing
the implementation of Article X recalled its earlier remarks by an accurate and percipient
statement that:
"It was observed that the peculiarities of biological agents and toxins were such that a
regime to ensure compliance with BWC undertakings would best be based on a
cooperative relationship between a future BTW organization and the national
authorities of States Parties.   Such cooperation would, inter alia, help the
organization obtain full knowledge of biological activity in each State Party and
throughout the world, thereby providing a strong deterrent to potential
violators, while at the same time offer the opportunity to increase the exchanges
between States parties in the biological field, with all-round benefits in terms of
increased confidence, enhanced biosafety practices and more reliable containment of
infectious diseases.   The adoption of a compliance regime along these lines would
                                                
46Brazil, Article X Implementation in a BWC Compliance Regime:  Aspects of a Cooperative Approach,
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 104, 17 September 1996.
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moreover provide a strong incentive for as broad participation as possible in the
implementation of the BWC."[Emphasis added]
The same paper refers later to:   "inclusion of a cooperative dimension in non-challenge visits
to biological institutions in States parties, during which information could be exchanged and
recommendations made...".   It goes on to say
".. measures such as these would bring benefits both to States parties and to the
effectiveness of the compliance regime.   The BW organization would obtain a
more thorough understanding of relevant activity in biology, microbiology and
related areas within States Parties, strengthening its capacity to detect deviant
patterns that may arouse suspicion."[Emphasis added].
This insight into the potential benefits of non-challenge visits appears to be soundly based
and accurate.
43.   A joint working paper47 by Sweden and the Netherlands further elaborated the concept
of on-site visits (other than those to investigate a non-compliance concern) to clarify the
distinction between non-challenge visits and other on-site visits in cases of ambiguities as
well as addressing the cost-effectiveness of NCVs.   In respect of cost-effectiveness, the paper
says:
"...the aim of NCVs will be primarily to deter non-compliance and to act as a deterrent
against proliferators using declared sites as a cover for non-compliant activities.
Furthermore, a system of NCVs could help strengthen confidence in the accuracy of
declarations.....   These objectives could be achieved by a relatively small number of
NCVs thereby limiting the costs and the burden on industry and science.
Furthermore, a system of NCVs should be effective and non-confrontational.
In order to conduct NCVs in a cost effective and professional manner, independent
inspectors will be required as this would also minimize the risks for leakages of
commercial proprietary and sensitive security information.  Many of the inspectors
which are on standby for other on-site activities could be used in the meantime for
NCVs thus limiting the extra costs.
NCVs could also play an important role in enhancing the inspectors professionalism
and give them necessary experience of various types of facilities.   As the numbers of
NCV will be limited the extra burden due to them on the inspectorate will be limited.
Without NCVs a programme for trial inspections to keep the inspectors well trained
would have to be extensive."
In respect of ambiguities, the case for a separate category of visits is argued.   It is pointed out
that the BTWC organisation will probably receive a large amount of declaration information
and during their examination, it will in certain cases be necessary to clarify certain
ambiguities within declarations.    Such ambiguities cannot be addressed by NCVs as NCVs
include a random selection and a quota element.   The case is set out for a consultation and
clarification procedure including on-site visits as necessary to resolve ambiguities.
                                                
47Sweden/the Netherlands, Further Elaboration of Concepts of On-Site Visits (other than those to investigate a
non-compliance concern),  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 105, 18 September 1996.
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44.   The FOC paper on compliance measures annexed to the procedural report of the
September 1996 AHG meeting included a separate section III 48 entitled "Other
Visits/Measures" which contained a number of items in square brackets:
"[A number of mandatory [non-challenge] visits to facilities in States parties could be
conducted to help strengthen confidence in the accuracy of declarations and to deter
non-compliance]
[Such visits could convey information to States parties about other relevant matters
and could therefore have a role to play in implementing Article V and Article X]
[Such visits could be focussed on key declared facilities eg. those involved in bio-
defence programmes]
[Such visits could take place at random]
[Such visits could take place at short notice]
[ Such visits could be subject to a quota system to govern their distribution]
[In the event that a State Party [or future organisation] wished to seek clarification of
an ambiguity or concern related to any other State Party's implementation of the
arrangements under the future regime, but which would not warrant an investigation
into a no-compliance concern, the State party of organization] could consult with the
other State Party to seek to resolve the ambiguity or concern, and could if necessary,
request [or initiate] a visit for confirmation.]
[Consideration could be given to whether any compliance measures could help
strengthen confidence in the implementation of Article III]]"
45.   The AHG meeting in March 1997, which was the fifth substantive meeting, saw
further working papers which addressed non-challenge visits.   An Indian working paper49 on
compliance with Article III includes the following measure:
"- Declarations may be subject to checks through inspections/visits by the future
BTWC organization"
46.   The European Union in a working paper50 set out various points relating to non-
challenge visits:
"A.  Purpose
                                                
48United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/32,  27 September 1996: Annex I, page 18.
49India, Guidelines to ensure Compliance with Obligations under Article III of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction (BTWC),  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 126, 5 March 1997
50European Union, Elements concerning Non Challenge Visits,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 132, 10 March
1997.
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The aim of NCVs would be primarily to deter non-compliance and to act as a
deterrent against proliferators using declared sites as a cover for non-compliant
activities.   Furthermore, a system of NCVs would help strengthen confidence in the
accuracy of declarations...
Inspectors during a non-challenge visit might be able to gather information that could
indicate a possible non-compliance concern.....The information resulting from NCVs
that could indicate a possible non-compliance concern could be followed up through
other measures, including clarification procedures/visits."
The paper goes on to make other relevant and valid points including:
"These visits should take place at declared sites only.
In order to achieve the deterrent effect, it is important these visits are carried out on
short notice.
In contrast to 'routine visits', a concept known from other disarmament instruments, a
deterrent effect could be reached by a relatively small number of non-challenge visits.
In order to restrict as much as possible the burden on industry, NCVs should be
subject to a quota system.....
NCVs would be initiated by the future BTWC organization in an objective manner
and in accordance with agreed guidelines, to ensure that the visits have a non-
confrontational nature.
Non-challenge visits could also serve other objects of the BTWC, such as
development of technological cooperation under Article X, as well as health and
safety."
It is important to note the point about the difference between NCVs and 'routine'
inspections in other disarmament regimes.
47.   A working paper51 by Austria and New Zealand addressing the implementation of
Article III proposes the provision of annual reports by States Parties on the implementation of
Article III and then goes on to propose that:
"These reports could be a basis for work undertaken during any clarification or other
appropriate visits carried out under the overall investigation mechanism."
48.   The FOC paper on compliance measures annexed to the procedural report of the March
1997 AHG meeting included a separate section III 52 entitled "Other Visits and Procedures".
This has two parts addressing first Non-Challenge Visits and then Clarification
Procedures/Visits.   The purpose of NCVs was described as follows:
                                                
51Austria/New Zealand, Working Paper by Austria and New Zealand,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 142, 14
March 1997.
52United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/34,  27 March 1997: Annex I, page 37.
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"- Mandatory NCVs at facilities would aim to deter non-compliance, and to act as a
deterrent against proliferators using declared sites as a cover for non-compliant
activities.   A system of NCVs would help strengthen confidence in the accuracy of
declarations...
- Inspectors during a NCV might be able to gather information that could indicate a
possible non-compliance concern.....The information resulting from NCVs that could
indicate a possible non-compliance concern could be followed up by other measures."
The point is also noted that "NCVs could also serve other objectives of the BTWC.   They
could convey information to States Parties about other relevant matters (e.g. health and
safety) and could have a role to play in implementing Article V and technological cooperation
under Article X."
49.   Clarification Procedures/Visits are described as having the following purposes:
"- Could help build confidence in the effectiveness of mandatory declarations as a
means to build transparency, by providing a means of clarifying/confirming a
declaration, through consultations and/or visits to declared sites.
- Could clarify any ambiguity, anomaly, gap or any other issue relating to a
declaration which has been submitted under the legally-binding regime.
- Could clarify whether there has been any error or omission resulting in the non-
declaration of a site that might be declarable under the Protocol/regime.
- Could clarify any other issue relating to a State party's implementation of the
arrangements under the future regime, but which would not warrant an investigation
into a non-compliance concern."
The FOC paper also included the point under the section on measures to strengthen the
implementation of  Article III that "Declarations may be subject to checks through
inspections/visits by the future BTWC Organization."
50.    At the July 1997 AHG meeting, consideration was focussed on a rolling text53 issued
on 9 June 1997 which incorporated the language from the FOC papers annexed to the March
procedural report.    The purpose and initiation on NCVs and clarification procedures/visits
appeared in draft Article II. G on pages 19 and 20 with implementation in Annex B on page
78.    A working paper54 by Australia, Austria, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden
and Switzerland proposed language for non-challenge visits which sought to consolidate
appropriate aspects of "Random Non-Challenge Visits" and "Ambiguity-Related Non-
Challenge Visits".    The purpose of such visits was stated as being:
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"The Organization shall conduct, in accordance with the detailed provisions contained
in the Annex on Implementation, a limited number per year of Random Non-
Challenge Visits to declared facilities in order to confirm that declarations are
consistent with this Protocol.
"The Organization may conduct, in accordance with the provisions in this Article and
the detailed provisions contained in the Annex on Implementation, Ambiguity Related
Non-Challenge Visits to declared facilities to resolve ambiguities in declarations."
Further sections of the working paper provide language on initiation, pre-visit activities,
conduct of visits and reports.   Although not stated in the "Purpose", the "Pre-Visit Activities"
section makes it clear that both types of visits shall have a mandate for the visit which will
include the words "and shall encourage cooperation with the State party" making it clear that
the aim is broader than just confirming declarations or resolving ambiguities.   The section on
reports includes the following:
"The report may make recommendations as appropriate and in cooperation with the
facility representatives, in such areas as the fulfillment of declaration obligations, bio-
safety standards, and good laboratory or manufacturing practice."
51.   A Canadian working paper55 addresses in more general terms why non-challenge visits
are an important element of a verification regime.   This notes that the Verification Principles
endorsed by the UN General Assembly on 7 December 1988 stated that
"Adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and
disarmament agreements"
and went on to say
"Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of providing, in a
timely fashion, clear and convincing evidence of compliance or non-compliance.
Continued confirmation of compliance is an essential ingredient to building and
maintaining confidence among the parties."[Emphasis added]
The Canadian paper notes that
"...the constituent elements of a verification regime can contribute in different ways
and to different degrees, to each of the overall purposes [of a BTWC verification
regime] listed above.......Other measures, by establishing a "baseline" of
State/International Organization relations and interactions, may have particular merit
in contributing to the assurance of compliance with certain obligations.  Non-
Challenge Visits (NCVs) ... are often characterized as serving such a purpose.  It is
generally understood that it is in the totality of the measures that the overall purpose
of the verification regime can be achieved through, on the one hand, certain insistent -
- perhaps even confrontational -- provisions; and, on the other, through more
cooperative procedures."
                                                
55Canada, Canadian Views on Non-Challenge Visits,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 193, 28 July 1997.
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The importance of the measures and obligations of the Protocol being treated as a "living
document" and not only as a "paper" commitment is emphasised.   Finally the paper notes the
key point that:
"Given the different industrial practices and procedures that vary from one firm to
another and one country to another, it should not be taken for granted that an
international inspectorate could simply arrive in an unfamiliar country and be
able to get on with its work immediately......the stage might be set for unnecessary
misunderstanding and friction, especially if there is no record of previous successful
interaction between the State party and the inspectorate....Visits offer an opportunity
for both sides to see the other in action, to understand how and why they do
things certain ways, and to understand each other's sensitivities and concerns.
All of these are worthy considerations, but one should not lose sight of the principal
reason for NCVs:  assurance of the fulfillment of the obligation to submit accurate,
complete declarations under the Protocol, as but a small part of fulfilling one's
national obligations under the Convention itself."[Emphasis added]
52.   The revised rolling text attached as Annex I to the procedural report addresses "[[Non-
Challenge][Random] Visits]" in Article III. F [Visits and Investigations]56.   This draws upon
the language offered in the working paper by Australia, Austria, Canada, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland in respect of both Random Non-Challenge Visits and
Ambiguity-Related Non-Challenge Visits.   Article III. F goes on to also address
"[Declaration Clarification and Consultation Procedures" which includes a section on
"[[Voluntary] Visits" which states that:
"Should [the Organization] and the requested State party be unable to resolve the
ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly, omission or other issue satisfactorily through such
consultations, [the Organization] [shall have the right to] [may, upon the request of
the State party] visit the declared facility or facilities in respect of which the
ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly, omission or other issue has arisen."
The section goes on to describe "Clarification Visits".   The current rolling text is unclear as
to whether "Clarification Visits" shall be requested by the Organization or by the State Party.
Furthermore, the difference between "Ambiguity-Related Non-Challenge Visits" which are
"to resolve ambiguities in declarations" and "Clarification Visits" which are to "clarify the
situation and promote accuracy and comprehensiveness in future declarations" appears to be
minimal -- apart from the important and significant difference as to whether the visits are
requested by the Organization or by the State Party.    In order to strengthen the BTWC, these
should be visits requested by the Organization.
53.    In addition Article VII (Scientific and Technological Exchange for Peaceful Purposes
and Technical Cooperation) of the rolling text, attached to the July 1996 AHG procedural
report, includes a section57 which addresses the provision of assistance to States Parties:
                                                
56United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/36,  4 August 1997: Annex I, Article III. F, page 28.
57United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/36,  4 August 1997: Annex I, Article VII, page 59.
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"[The BTWC Organization shall develop a framework for activities aimed at
providing assistance to the States Parties [to the Protocol], and in particular to the
developing countries being States parties [to the Protocol].   Taking full account of
existing agreements and competences of the relevant international organizations, and
bearing in mind the need to avoid duplicating existing activities and mechanisms, [the
following should, inter alia, be considered by the States Parties directly or through a
future institutional mechanism] [the BTWCO should ensure, through its own
institutional framework [or directly by States parties,] provision of the following]:
a.  assistance to States Parties, if requested, for the preparation of declarations
required [under this Protocol][as part of the compliance regime];
b. assistance to States Parties, if requested, in drawing up internal legislation
necessary [under this Protocol][to the compliance regime];...
d.  [inclusion of a cooperative dimension in (non-challenge/other on-site
measures) visits to States Parties, with a view to:]
i.   exchanging information and providing expert advice, assistance and
appropriate recommendations on biological practices;
ii.   sharing information concerning cooperative programmes in
biosafety, identification of agents, diagnostics and the development of
innovative vaccines, aimed at being low-cost products, safe and
useable under difficult conditions;....
The approach envisaged in such cooperative measures is clearly one which would be
requested by the State Party seeking such assistance and help.
Analysis
54.   It is thus clear that there has been debate about the role of Non-Challenge Visits for
some time.   Most of the arguments why NCVs are a necessary, and, indeed, essential element
which can make a substantial contribution to a strengthened BTWC have been made at
various times by many delegations.
55.  Other delegations have expressed concern about the effectiveness and costs of NCVs as
well as about the potential burden on industry and the possible risk to confidential proprietary
information (CPI).   Although the concept of random NCVs envisages very infrequent visits,
it will be evident that nevertheless the possibility of such random visits to declared facilities
will provide an incentive, which will be very much greater than the efforts involved in
mounting random NCVs, to provide accurate declarations and, in would-be proliferators, to
take steps to ensure that no traces of prohibited programmes are evident in declared facilities.
The costs of random NCVs -- both in mounting and receiving them -- should not be high.   A
future BTWC organization will need to have an international inspectorate capable of
mounting non-compliance concern investigations at short notice;  consideration of the
numbers of inspectors needed to be able to mount such a compliance concern investigation at
any time shows that the BTWC organization will need to have a somewhat larger group of
inspectors available to compensate for those on annual leave, sickness or undergoing training
to join the group.  The effectiveness and professional standing of this group of inspectors will
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be enhanced if they are used to carry out NCVs whenever they are not engaged in non-
compliance concern investigations.   The costs of NCVs carried out in this way would be
modest.   As to the burden on industry, it needs to be recognised that, increasingly around the
world, public concern about the safe handling and storage of pathogens and toxins is
demanding increased inspection by national health and safety authorities.   Furthermore, as
these are non-challenge visits of declared facilities whose goal is to confirm compliance and
to validate the accuracy of declarations;  in some cases, they will be to clarify uncertainties or
ambiguities.   The burden on industry should be slight and there should be no risk to CPI.
56.   The situation has, however, been confused by the use of the term NCV to cover three
types of visit -- all of which are non-challenge yet one is a random measure involving visits
to declared facilities whilst the other two categories are focussed either to clarify a
declaration or to address an ambiguity -- in both of these cases there is no random element.
In addition, it is apparent that the cooperative measures outlined in Article VI in which visits
on request would be made fall into the category of focussed visits as the assistance sought by
a State Party will be specific;   waiting until a random visit happens to be made to a particular
State or to a particular facility is unlikely to meet the requirement.    It is also very clear that
NCVs are not "routine inspections" of the type in the verification regime for the CWC.
Random NCVs will involve infrequent visits to declared facilities -- and it should be recalled
that the aim in determining which facilities will be declared will be to declare those facilities
of most relevance to the BTWC and not all facilities of possible relevance.     In addition, the
format of the FOC papers has not been such as to facilitate the consolidation of the arguments
for the different categories of NCVs into a comprehensive statement;  for understandable
reasons, the emphasis has been on brevity wherever possible.  There does not seem to have
been a comprehensive statement in a working paper which draws together all the reasons why
both random and focussed NCVs are so important.
57.   The random non-challenge visits to declared facilities are a particularly important
element of a future regime for a strengthened BTWC.     Of the nine reasons why NCVs are
important set out below, most if not all apply to the random NCVs to declared facilities
whilst some (such as c and d) may be more applicable to focussed NCVs.
a.   to contribute to an integrated and effective regime for a strengthened BTWC --
"It is highly unlikely that agreement could ever be secured for a protocol based
exclusively on challenge inspections.... A mechanism with only a challenge
provision would set an unnecessary high threshold for the on-site measures
that could be taken to pursue non-compliance concerns.   There are also
grounds for doubting whether such an arrangement could be as effective as a
package of interrelated measures consisting of declarations, short notice
validation/information inspections/visits, challenge inspections and procedures
for investigating alleged use."[UK, para 28 above, ref 31]
b.  to strengthen confidence in the accuracy of declarations --
"assurance of the fulfillment of the obligation to submit accurate, complete
declarations under the Protocol" [Canada, para 51 above, ref 55]
c.   to clarify and confirm declarations --
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"Alongside short notice inspections, it seems useful to establish a mechanism
of validation visits, which would be part of cooperation programs between the
organization and national authorities.   Such visits would help in the process of
preparing, checking, updating and improving national declarations and would
lead to recommendations by the secretariat to national authorities and facility
operators, including recommendations on biological safety practices." [Brazil,
para 14 above, ref 13]
d.  to clarify other ambiguities  --
"The measures set forth in the protocol should help strengthen the Convention
by establishing an official benchmark for identifying discrepancies or
ambiguities pertaining to facilities or activities and for seeking clarification,
providing a mechanism for pursuing specific activities of concern and
allowing for direct diplomatic engagement to resolve compliance concerns."
[USA, para 13 above, ref 11]
e.   to deter non-compliance and act as a deterrent to cheating at a declared site --
"the deterrence value against non-compliance of short-notice non-challenge
visits, even if such visits are relatively limited in number, would make a
significant contribution to a future verification Protocol."[EU, para 38 above,
ref 42]
f.  to encourage cooperation with States Parties --
"information/Validation visits could be an important element of a future BWC
verification system, providing both deterrence and transparency, and could
harness several cooperation activities." [Brazil, para 34 above, ref 37]
"Such cooperation would, inter alia, help the organization obtain full
knowledge of biological activity in each State Party and throughout the world,
thereby providing a strong deterrent to potential violators, while at the same
time offer the opportunity to increase the exchanges between States parties in
the biological field, with all-round benefits in terms of increased confidence,
enhanced biosafety practices and more reliable containment of infectious
diseases."[Brazil, para 42 above, ref 46]
g.   to assist in building a picture over time of national norm in microbiological
activities --
"could be used by an inspectorate to build up a picture of the normal activity
and to assess overall consistency and coherence." [VEREX, para 11 above]
h.  to enhance the efficiency, preparedness and professional standing of the
inspectorate  --
"on-site inspections of a routine type for validation of declarations and
information gathering for the BTWC should be strongly restricted in frequency
and intensity to a small number of inspections/visits per year to keep
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inspectors and an inspectorate well trained and give them adequate experience
but at the same time limiting the costs." [Sweden, para 30 above, ref 33]
"NCVs could also play an important role in enhancing the inspectors
professionalism and give them necessary experience of various types of
facilities.   As the numbers of NCV will be limited the extra burden due to
them on the inspectorate will be limited.   Without NCVs a programme for
trial inspections to keep the inspectors well trained would have to be
extensive." [Sweden/Netherlands, para 43 above, ref 47]
i.  to avoid misunderstandings and incorrect judgements --
"Non-challenge visits would help to build transparency and could clarify
concerns which might otherwise lead to false judgements being made."[EU,
para 38 above, ref 42]
"Given the different industrial practices and procedures that vary from one
firm to another and one country to another, it should not be taken for granted
that an international inspectorate could simply arrive in an unfamiliar country
and be able to get on with its work immediately......the stage might be set for
unnecessary misunderstanding and friction, especially if there is no record of
previous successful interaction between the State party and the
inspectorate....Visits offer an opportunity for both sides to see the other in
action, to understand how and why they do things certain ways, and to
understand each other's sensitivities and concerns." [Canada, para 51 above,
ref 55]
58.  Although in the earlier debate in the AHG about NCVs, there was emphasis then on such
visits being at short notice, this emphasis has become less evident recently.   It is clear that
short notice is particularly important for non-compliance concern investigations when timely
investigation is needed.   When NCVs are considered, it is evident that clarification and
ambiguity related visits will be more effective if the State Party being inspected has been able
to prepare for the visit and has its relevant experts available.   A similar argument applies to
cooperation visits made at the request of a State Party.   Insofar as random visits are
concerned, short notice visits are not a prerequisite for the achievement of most of the
objectives of such NCVs.
59.  It is evident that there are a number of important reasons why random as well as
focussed NCVs are important elements of a future regime additional to those cited in the
current rolling text in Article III. F.   Of particular importance are those relating to the
avoidance of incorrect judgements and the building up of a benchmark appreciation of both
national and world-wide activities in biology and microbiology against which consistency and
coherence can be assessed.   It has to be stressed that in the absence of random NCVs, the
risk will be increased that the assessment made by a non-compliance investigation may be
incorrect -- resulting in a false negative (ie failing to detect non-compliant activity when it is
present) or a false positive (ie judging an activity to be non-compliant when it is actually
compliant).   Such a situation would bring the strengthened BTWC into disrepute and will not
strengthen national and international security.
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60.    As has been recognised by several delegations, a package of integrated measures need
to be crafted to create an effective Protocol to strengthen the BTWC.    It is improbable that
agreement could ever be secured for a protocol based exclusively on challenge inspections --
or that such a protocol would be effective in building confidence in compliance.   A
mechanism with only a challenge provision would set an unnecessary high threshold for the
on-site measures that could be taken to pursue non-compliance concerns.   A package of
interrelated measures consisting of mandatory declarations, random as well as focussed
NCVs, and non-compliance concern investigations of both facility and field will be needed.
61.   There would be benefits to the AHG if a State Party were to set out clearly the
arguments for both random and focussed NCVs as this would serve to provide a useful aide
memoire to the negotiators who are endeavouring to incorporate into the rolling text the
provisions for both random and focussed NCVs.   There could also be benefit if the rolling
text were to adopt language such as random and focussed to distinguish between the two
fundamental types of NCVs as both are important elements that would contribute
significantly to the effectiveness of a future legally binding instrument to strengthen the
BTWC.
Conclusions
62.   Consideration of the VEREX discussion together with the provisions of the CWC and
the experience gained by UNSCOM and the subsequent AHG discussion shows that the
advantages of non-challenge visits far outweigh the possible disadvantages and that random
as well as focussed NCVs are a necessary and important element of the package of measures
needed for an effective verification regime to strengthen the BTWC.   The rolling text needs
to be developed so that both categories of NCVs are incorporated in the legally binding
instrument.
